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REMOVAL OF A NUTRIENT FEEDING TUBE
AND THE NEED FOR A LIVING WILL
In a continuing effort to apply legal principles to the life and death ques-
tions presented by modem medical procedures, at least two state courts,
New Jersey and Massachusetts, have recently wrestled with the question of
whether to allow removal of a feeding tube from an incompetent patient.'
There are some who argue that removal of a feeding tube is a form of active
euthanasia whereby the patient would starve to death.2 Others maintain
that removal of a tube which mechanically provides nutrition and hydration
is completely analagous to removal of an artificial respirator, a practice
which was recognized as permissible in the seminal case involving Karen
Ann Quinlan.3 In 1976 the Supreme Court of New Jersey announced in In
re Quinlan that the right to refuse medical treatment can be extended to an
incompetent patient by way of a third party guardian.4 The Quinlan court
sanctioned a request for the removal of an artificial respirator, thought to
have been sustaining Miss Quinlan's life.5 As a forerunner in this area, the
New Jersey State Supreme Court has recently decided in In re Conroy that
there is no analytical difference between removing an artificial feeding tube
and disconnecting an artificial respirator. 6 Similarly, in Brophy v. New Eng-
land Sinai Hospital,7 the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts has held
that there is no difference between removal of an artificial respirator and
denial of nutrition through the removal of a feeding tube.
In addition to the debate in state courts regarding the legality of removing
nutrient feeding tubes, thirty-six state legislatures and the District of Colum-
1. Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., No. 4152, slip op. at 1 (Mass. Sept. 11, 1986); In
Re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209 (1985).
2. See generally Horan & Grant, The Legal Aspects of Withdrawing Nourishment, 5 J.
LEGAL MED. 595 (1984) (concluding that removal of any feeding tube would be the direct and
proximate cause of death by starvation).
3. See Note, Natural Death: An Alternative in New Jersey, In Re Conroy, 73 GEo. L.J.
1331, 1339 (1985) (where the author suggests that the distinction between active and passive
euthanasia is a nebulous one).
4. In Re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647, cert. denied, Garger v. New Jersey, 429 U.S.
922 (1976).
5. Karen Ann Quinlan's respirator was removed on June 10, 1976, and she died on June
15, 1985. Gelfand, Euthanasia and the Terminally Ill Patient, 63 NEB. L. REV. 741, 749 n.34
(1984); Karen Ann Quinlan Dies, 71 A.B.A. J. 63 (1985).
6. In Re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 486 A.2d 1209.
7. Brophy, No. 4152, slip op. at 32.
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bia s continue to grapple with the broader issue of the right to die by enacting
living will statutes. These statutes, popularly referred to as Living Will, Nat-
ural Death or Right to Die Acts, provide a vehicle for individuals to assist
themselves and others in this area of decision-making. The typical dilemma
is a scenario whereby an individual has suffered irreversible brain damage
and is in a persistent vegetative state. The question then becomes whether to
maintain "life" through artificial means. These statutes are intended to re-
lieve the families and physicians of the burden of such decisions by allowing
individuals to make their own choice in advance and then to publish that
decision in a living will declaration. Typically, the living will instructs the
physician to remove life support systems when there is no hope for recovery.
Some scholars have suggested that the living will is the best solution to the
moral and legal controversies which surround the subject of euthanasia.9
Unfortunately, these living wills do not always provide the simple answer for
which they were intended. 0
The thrust of this comment is twofold. It begins with a discussion of what
standards may be applied by third parties in the decision-making process for
8. ALA. CODE §§ 22-8A-1 to -10 (1984); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 36-3201 to -3210
(1986); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 82-3801 to -3804 (Supp. 1985); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§§ 7185-7195 (West Supp. 1985); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 15-18-101 to -113 (Supp. 1986); 1985
CONN. ACTS 85-606 (Reg. Sess.); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, §§ 2501-2509 (1983); D.C. CODE
ANN. § 6-2421 to -2430 (Supp. 1986); FLA. STAT. § 765.01 to -.15 (1986); GA. CODE ANN.
§§ 31-32-1 to -12 (1985 & Supp. 1986); IDAHO CODE §§ 39-4501 to -4508 (1985 & Supp.
1986); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 1101/2, para. 701-710 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1986); IND. CODE ANN.
§§ 16-8-11 to -21 (Burns Supp. 1986); IOWA CODE ANN. §§ 144A.1 to.11 (West Supp. 1986);
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-28-101 to -109 (1980); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.58.1 to .10
(West Supp. 1986); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 22, §§ 2921 to 2931 (Supp. 1986); MD.
HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. §§ 5-601 to -614 (Supp. 1986); MIss. CODE ANN. §§ 41-41-101 to
-121 (Supp. 1985); Mo. ANN. STAT. §§ 459.010 to .055 (Vernon Supp. 1986); MONT. CODE
ANN. §§ 50-9-101 to -111 (1985); NEV. REV. STAT. §§ 449.540 to .690 (1986); N.H. REV.
STAT. ANN. §§ 137-14:1 to :16 (Supp. 1985); N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-7-1 to -11 (1986); N.C.
GEN. STAT. §§ 90-320 to -322 (1985); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, §§ 3101 to 3111 (West Supp.
1987); OR. REV. STAT. §§ 97.050 to .090 (1985); TENN. CODE ANN. § 32-11-101 to -110
(Supp. 1986); TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 4590h (Vernon Supp. 1986); UTAH CODE
ANN. §§ 75-2-1101 to -1118 (Supp. 1986); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, §§ 5251 to 5262 (Supp.
1985); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 54-325.8:1 to :13 (Supp. 1986); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§§ 70.122.010 to .905 (Supp. 1986); W. VA. CODE §§ 16-30-1 to -10 (1985); Wis. STAT. ANN.
§§ 154.01 to .15 (West Supp. 1986); Wyo. STAT. §§ 33-26-144 to -152 (Supp. 1986).
9. E.g., Kunter, Euthanasia: Due Processfor Death with Dignity, the Living Will, 54 IND.
L.J. 201 (1978).
10. See generally Reaves, Wills: Uniform Law Proposal, 70 A.B.A. J. 29 (1984) (discussing
the problem of enforceability of a living will executed in a foreign jurisdiction and the need for
reciprocity among the states with these statutes. One of the problems, however, is that the
state statutes vary so significantly that reciprocity would be difficult. Accordingly, the Na-
tional Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws ("NCCUSL") has taken up the
issue of a uniform living will act.). See also Note, Living Wills - Needfor Legal Recognition,
78 W. VA. L. REV. 370 (1976).
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an incompetent patient, and how these standards meet the important need
for certainty. In this discussion, a careful analysis is made of the substituted
judgment test and how living wills may be an example of documenting the
wishes of a patient so as to provide the needed certainty. Second, this com-
ment presents an analysis of when these standards should apply and whether
the incompetent patient's death need be imminent before a third party
guardian's request may be considered. Here, the comment attempts to dis-
cern whether there is a true analytical difference between removal of an arti-
ficial respirator and removal of a nutrient feeding tube. Specifically, the
question of whether a feeding tube can be classified as "extraordinary care"
(so as to be removable) is addressed.
I. THE HISTORY OF THE RIGHT To REFUSE MEDICAL TREATMENT
Although not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution, Mr. Justice Bran-
deis stated in a 1928 dissenting opinion regarding the notion of the right to
privacy, that "[the makers of the Constitution] conferred against govern-
ment the right to be left alone - the most comprehensive of rights and the
right most valued by civilized men.''"
It was not until the 1965 decision of Griswold v. Connecticut 12 that the
Court first clearly enunciated the concept of an unwritten penumbra right of
privacy emanating from the Bill of Rights as a guarantee under the Constitu-
tion. This right has developed to include the right to marry, 3 to have chil-
dren' 4 and to receive contraceptives.15 Placing this privacy right in the
context of decisions to decline medical treatment, the Court held in the
landmark case of Roe v. Wade 16 that a woman's decision to terminate her
pregnancy is protected under this right. Presumably, the federal right is
broad enough to encompass a patient's decision to decline medical treatment
under certain circumstances, in much the same way as it is broad enough to
11. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting). The
notion of a privacy right stemming from the Constitution actually predates this 1928 case. In
1890, Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis published an article in the Harvard Law Review in
which they argued that victims of various press excesses of the day were entitled to relief based
upon the broader "right of privacy" principle. Warren & Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4
HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890).
12. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (privacy right encompasses married
couple's right to use of contraceptives).
13. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (miscegenation statute declared uncon-
stitutional).
14. Carey v. Population Serv. Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 685 (1977) (right of minors to receive
contraceptives, where the Court held that the "decision whether or not to beget or bear a
child" is encompassed by the "constitutionally protected right of privacy").
15. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
16. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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encompass a woman's decision to terminate pregnancy under certain
conditions.
Although state courts have extended this right to the decisions regarding
the discontinuation of life-sustaining medical treatment,"7 the Supreme
Court has not yet considered such a case. 18 The federal constitutional right
of privacy" continues to be interpreted by several state courts to include a
patient's decision to decline medical treatment under certain circumstances,
even where the decision may lead to the patient's death.2' This right to
refuse medical treatment, however, is not absolute. 2' The state maintains an
interest in preserving life which may conflict with this personal interest of
privacy. The Supreme Court has made it clear that when such a conflict
arises, a balancing test must be applied.22 The underlying state interests
must be identified and then weighed against the harm to the patient's inter-
ests which would result from allowing the patient to die.23 In addition to the
compelling state interest in preserving life, 24 the courts have found compel-
ling state interests in preventing suicide,25 safeguarding the integrity of the
medical profession,26 and protecting innocent third parties.27 When the ex-
17. See, e.g., Superintendent of Belchertown State School v. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. 728,
370 N.E.2d 417 (1977); In Re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 40, 355 A.2d 647, 663 (1976); cf. John F.
Kennedy Memorial Hosp. v. Heston, 58 N.J. 576, 279 A.2d 670 (1971) (where only 5 years
prior to Quinlan the New Jersey Supreme Court held that "there is no constitutional right to
choose to die." Id. at 580, 279 A.2d at 672).
18. In fact, the Supreme Court has recently curtailed the trend of a broad interpretation
of the notion of a privacy right in Bowers v. Hardwick, 106 S. Ct. 2841 (1986) (where the
Court upheld the contested Georgia sodomy statute by essentially stating that private, adult
consensual homosexual conduct is not protected by the constitutional right to privacy).
19. See supra note 11.
20. Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at 740, 370 N.E.2d at 424; In Re Quackenbush, 156 N.J. Super.
282, 290, 383 A.2d 785, 789 (Morris County Ct. 1979) (patient who could have undergone
operation to amputate both gangrenous legs was permitted to refuse operation); In Re Quin-
lan, 70 N.J. at 40, 355 A.2d at 663.
21. In Re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 348, 486 A.2d 1209, 1223 (1985).
22. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
23. Id.
24. See In Re President & Directors of Georgetown College, 331 F.2d 1000 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 377 U.S. 978 (1964) (blood transfusion ordered by Judge Wright for Jehovah's
Witness whose religious beliefs made such procedure abhorrent, over refusal by patient's hus-
band to give consent); John F Kennedy Memorial Hosp., 58 N.J. 576, 279 A.2d 670 (blood
transfusion ordered for Jehovah's Witness patient who could not give consent because of ex-
treme shock). The New Jersey Supreme Court distinguishes these cases from Quinlan and
Conroy type cases because the patients were apparently "saveable to long life and vibrant
health." In Re Quinlan, 70 N.J. at 39, 355 A.2d at 663.
25. See In Re Caulk, 125 N.H. 226, 231-32, 480 A.2d 93, 96-97 (1984) (attempt by other-
wise healthy state prisoner to starve himself to death because he preferred death to life is
considered attempted suicide and state could force him to eat).
26. See Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at 742, 370 N.E.2d at 426 (acknowledging the institutional
considerations of maintaining the ethical integrity of the medical profession by allowing hospi-
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ercise of a patient's right to refuse treatment is outweighed by any of these
overriding state interests, a patient's request to withdraw treatment will be
denied.28
In the absence of a definitive ruling on the issue by the Supreme Court,
some state courts have refused to find a right of privacy when the issue of
discontinuing life-sustaining medical treatment arises. For instance, the
New York Court of Appeals has refused to consider the privacy question in
a right to die case, resolving the matter instead based on the common law
right to be free from bodily intrusions.29 In In Re Storar, the same New
York court allowed a patient's removal from a respirator based on this com-
mon law right.3"
The exercise of the right to refuse medical treatment is less certain, how-
ever, when asserted by a third party guardian for the incompetent patient.
Although usually permitted, the courts have not yet adopted a uniform stan-
dard to apply in these cases. Basically the question is one of the best interest
versus substituted judgment.3" The traditional best interest standard, ap-
tals to provide care for people under their control. N.B., however, that with this 67-year-old
mentally retarded man who developed leukemia, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
allowed him to die.) See also In Re President & Directors of Georgetown College, 331 F.2d 1000;
John F Kennedy Memorial Hosp., 58 N.J. 576, 279 A.2d 670.
27. See, e.g., Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905) (validating the enforceability
of mandatory smallpox vaccination laws); Holmes v. Silver Cross Hosp., 340 F. Supp. 125, 130
(N.D. 11. 1972) (overruling parental objections to life-saving blood transfusions to save a mi-
nor child's life).
28. In Re Conroy, 98 N.J. at 349, 486 A.2d at 1223.
29. The common law right to be free from bodily intrusions stems from a cause of action
in trespass upon the person. As Justice Cardozo stated while sitting on the New York Court of
Appeals in the 1914 case of Schloendorff v. Society of New York Hosp., 211 N.Y. 125, 127,
105 N.E. 92, 93 (1914), "Every human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to
determine what shall be done with his own body; and a surgeon who performs an operation
without his patient's consent commits an assault for which he is liable in damages .... " See
also Natanson v. Kline, 186 Kan. 393, 408, 350 P.2d 1093, 1104, clarified, 187 Kan. 196, 354
P.2d 670 (1960) (the right to decline nonconsensual medical treatment was explicity stated for
the first time).
30. In Re Storar, 52 N.Y.2d 363, 420 N.E.2d 64, 438 N.Y.S.2d 266, cert. denied, 454 U.S.
858 (1981) (the court here balanced the common law right to be free from bodily intrusions
against the state interest in preserving life similar to the way this test has been applied in the
privacy cases).
31. Best interest is the traditional notion that the physician should do everything possible
that would be in the "best interest" of the patient for his recovery, whereas the doctrine of
substituted judgment is the method by which a guardian, in making a decision for his ward,
tries to determine what decision the ward would have made, if able, under the circumstances.
For a more detailed explanation of the differences, see Saikewicz, 373 Mass. at 751-52, 370
N.E.2d at 430-31 (for historical background and modem use of substituted judgment); Weber,
Substituted Judgment Doctrine; A Critical Analysis, 1 IssuEs L. & MED. 131 (1985); see also
Hart v. Brown, 29 Conn. Supp. 368, 370, 289 A.2d 386, 387-88 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1972);
Strunk v. Strunk, 445 S.W.2d 145, 148 (Ky. 1969).
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plied prior to the advent of high-tech health care, allowed decisions to be
made for incompetent patients based upon the perceived best interest of the
patient.32 This usually translated into directives for the administration of all
treatment necessary to preserve life. 33 However, with the onslaught of ad-
vanced medical technology which increases the ability to prolong life by us-
ing mechanical devices, there has been a growing trend towards allowing
decision-making for the incompetent patient based on a standard of substi-
tuted judgment. This method takes into consideration what the patient
would want were he competent to decide. 34 The standard can include cessa-
tion or withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment provided that it qualifies as
"extraordinary care," notwithstanding its availability, based on the well es-
tablished right to refuse medical treatment.
The paradigmatic situation involves a decision whether to discontinue or
refrain from initiating a treatment which will maintain the life of an incom-
petent patient, but which will not affect a cure. Artificial respiration and
mechanical dialysis traditionally fall into this category.35 Several recent
state court cases36 have added to this category of medical devices the naso-
gastric and gastronomic feeding tubes. Treatment by these tubes may be
painful and expensive, while failure to treat may result in accelerated or im-
mediate death.37 It is not at all clear, however, whether these artifical/
mechanical feeding devices qualify as "extraordinary" medical treatment.
This dilemma has resulted in a deluge of applications to courts by legal
guardians for rulings on what their obligations are with respect to patients
who are being kept alive by such feeding tubes.
In In re Quinlan, the New Jersey Supreme Court disallowed evidence of
the patient's hypothesized intent in keeping with the traditional notion of
best interest.3" The Conroy court expressly rejected this portion of the Quin-
lan decision by adopting a limited objective test which allows direct evidence
demonstrating what the patient's intent may have been and gives credence to
the doctrine of substituted judgment.39 The court stated that "such evidence
32. Clarke, The Choice to Refuse or Withhold Medical Treatment: The Emerging Tech-
nology and Medical Ethical Consensus, 13 CREIGHTON L. REV. 795, 822 (1980).
33. Id. at 806, 823-24.
34. See generally Comment, In Re Storar: The Right to Die and Incompetent Patients, 43
U. PITT. L. REV. 1087 (1982).
35. See Weber, supra note 31, at 131, 133.
36. See, e.g., Corbett v. D'Alessandro, 487 So. 2d 368, 371 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1986); In
Re Jobes, No. C-4971-85E, slip op. at 6 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. Apr. 23, 1986).
37. Corbett, 487 So. 2d at 368; In Re Jobes, No. C-4971-85E, slip op. at 12.
38. In Re Quinlan, 137 N.J. Super. at 260, 348 A.2d at 801.
39. In Re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 362, 486 A.2d 1209, 1230 (1985) (To the extent that
Conroy conflicts with Quinlan, Quinlan was expressly overruled).
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is certainly relevant to... whether the patient would have consented to the
treatment if competent to make the decision."'  The Conroy court went on
to cite living wills as an example of a form this needed evidence may take.4
In keeping with this evolutionary trend, and possibly taking it one step fur-
ther, the trial court in Brophy held that the right to refuse medical treatment,
extended to the incompetent patient, "is to be exercised through a 'substi-
tuted judgment' on his behalf."4 2 When a patient's right to reject treatment
was weighed against the state's interest in preserving life, the Brophy court
stated:
[I]n certain, thankfully rare circumstances the burden of maintain-
ing the corporeal existence degrades the very humanity it was
meant to serve. The law recognizes the individual's right to pre-
serve his humanity, even if to preserve his humanity means to al-
low the natural processes of a disease or affliction to bring about a
death with dignity.43
The Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts thus allowed Brophy's substi-
tuted judgment to prevail by issuing a final order which would facilitate the
removal of his feeding tube either at another hospital or at home.
As the law presently stands, the federal constitutional right of privacy
extends to a patient who wishes to refuse medical treatment when that right
is not outweighed by certain state interests. Given the existence of this right,
it is now clear that it may be exercised by the incompetent patient. How-
ever, when a third party attempts to exercise this right on behalf of the in-
competent patient the courts must apply a balancing test. The court will
consider whether there are countervailing state interests which outweigh the
decision to exercise this right. Among the state interests which have been
identified in prior cases are: (1) the preservation of life," (2) the protection
of the interests of innocent third parties,4 5 (3) the prevention of suicide,46
40. Id.
41. Id. at 363, 486 A.2d at 1230-3 1. A living will is a declaration which provides instruc-
tions to one's family and physicians on what to do should one become incompetent and a
decision must be made as to whether extraordinary medical care should be used and/or contin-
ued. These declarations are sometimes statutorily and judicially sanctioned. E.g., John F.
Kennedy Memorial Hosp. v. Bludworth, 452 So. 2d 921 (Fla. 1984); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY
CODE §§ 7185-95 (West Supp. 1985); see generally Comment, Living Will: Already a Practical
Alternative, 55 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 665 (1977).
42. Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., No. 85 E 00090-GI, slip op. at 30 (Oct. 21,
1985).
43. Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., No. 4152, slip op. at 21 (Mass. Sept. 11, 1986).
44. See cases cited supra note 24.
45. See, e.g., Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11, 37 (1905) (recognizing enforceabil-
ity of compulsory smallpox vaccination law); Holmes v. Silver Cross Hosp., 340 F. Supp. 125,
130 (N.D. Ill. 1972) (indicating that patient's status as father of minor child may justify au-
thorizing blood transfusion to save his life, despite his religious objections); Commissioner of
1987]
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and (4) the maintenance of the ethical integrity of the medical profession.47
Each court, then, on a case by case basis, must apply the balancing test to
determine when a third party guardian may exercise the constitutional right
on behalf of an incompetent patient.48
II. A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE CASES DEALING WITH A
THIRD PARTY REQUEST To REMOVE A NUTRIENT
FEEDING TUBE FROM THE INCOMPETENT PATIENT:
WHAT STANDARDS SHOULD APPLY?
A. The Conroy Case.- A Medical Dilemma Seeking a Legal Answer
-Claire Conroy led a rather secluded life, living alone, with few friends and
never marrying.49 Thomas Whittemore, her nephew and only surviving
blood relative, was appointed guardian ad litem when she became incompe-
tent in 1979." 0 He testified before the trial court that Miss Conroy feared
and avoided doctors and that to the best of his knowledge she had never
visited one until she became incompetent. 5' Mr. Whittemore decided not to
consent to the amputation of Miss Conroy's gangrenous leg in 1982, based
on substituted judgment.52 He then sought removal of the nasogastric tube,
which was providing nourishment to her, on the same basis. He was of the
opinion that were she competent to decide for herself, she would not have
allowed its insertion in the first place53 and would not have consented to its
Correction v. Myers, 379 Mass. 255, 399 N.E.2d 452 (1979) (compelling prisoner to submit to
necessary kidney dialysis over his protest in order to get transfer to lower security prison).
46. See In Re Caulk, 125 N.H. at 226, 480 A.2d at 96-97 (1984) (state was permitted to
force otherwise healthy prisoner to eat in light of his attempt to starve himself to death. Pris-
oner stated that he preferred death to life in prison which the court considered attempted
suicide).
47. See Bouvia v. County of Riverside, No. 159780, slip op. at 4 (Cal. Super. Ct. Dec. 16,
1983) (competent, non-terminal patient with severe cerebral palsy who refused to eat could not
demand that health care providers help her commit suicide); cf. Justice Nolan's dissent in the
Brophy case which demonstrates that there is still much dispute as to how these interests are to
be weighed against one another:
[I] can think of nothing more degrading to the human person than the balance which
the court struck today in favor of death against life. It is but another triumph for the
forces of secular humanism (modern paganism) (sic) which have now succeeded in
imposing their anti-life principles at both ends of life's spectrum.
Brophy, No. 4152, slip. op. at 2 (Nolan, J., dissenting).
48. See generally Comment, Right to Refuse Medical Treatment.- Under What Circum-
stances Does it Exist?, 18 DUQ. L. REV. 607 (1980).
49. In Re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 338-40, 486 A.2d 1209, 1218 (1985).
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. See discussion on substituted judgment supra note 31.
53. In Re Conroy, 98 N.J. at 340, 486 A.2d at 1218.
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continuance.
Miss Conroy's physicians testified as to her condition at the time removal
of the feeding tube was sought.54 Although not brain dead,55 her intellectual
capacity was very limited and her mental condition, they testified, would
never improve.56 In fact, several doctors stated that even with the excellent
care she was receiving, Miss Conroy had perhaps a few months to live.57
She was suffering from severe organic brain syndrome, a gangrenous foot,
ulcers on her left leg and hip, urinary tract infection, arteriosclerotic heart
disease, hypertension and diabetes.58 She could neither control her bowels
nor speak; her ability to swallow was very limited and she was unable to
move from a semi-fetal position.59 Testimony regarding her capacity to ex-
perience pain was inconclusive.6° Given the "hopelessness" of her condi-
tion, and in light of her ongoing suffering, her physician recommended that
the feeding tube be removed. 61 He classified her medical treatment as being
extraordinary or optional.62
Reverend Joseph Kukura, a Roman Catholic priest 63 and Professor of
Christian Ethics at the Immaculate Conception Seminary in Mahwah, New
Jersey, agreed with the doctor, relying upon a Vatican report on euthana-
sia.' The test that the Church proffered required weighing the burdens
against the benefits of continued existence through the aid of extraordinary
life-sustaining medical treatment. Extraordinary treatment is defined in this
report as procedures which are burdensome or inconvenient or which offer
no hope of benefit to the patient.65 Father Kukura concluded that the use of
the nasogastric feeding tube was extraordinary in this case and that it would
be morally and ethically permissible to remove it.
66
54. Id. at 338, 486 A.2d at 1216.
55. The criteria for brain death include "absence of response to pain or other stimuli,
pupilary reflexes, corneal, pharyngeal and other reflexes, blood pressure, spontaneous respira-
tion, as well as 'flat' or isoelectric electroencephalograms and the like, with all tests repeated
'at least 24 hours later with no change.'" In Re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 27, 355 A.2d 647, 664
(1976) (quoting 1968 Report of the Ad Hoc Committee of the Harvard Medical School).
56. In Re Conroy, 98 N.J. at 339, 486 A.2d at 1217.
57. Id. at 339, 486 A.2d at 1218.
58. Id. at 337, 486 A.2d at 1217.
59. Id. at 338, 486 A.2d at 1218.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 339, 486 A.2d at 1219.
63. Id. Miss Conroy was a Roman Catholic.
64. Id. at 340, 486 A.2d at 1218 (citing VATICAN CONGREGATION FOR THE DOCTRINE
OF FAITH, DECLARATION ON EUTHANASIA (June 26, 1980)).
65. See id. at 340, 486 A.2d at 1218.
66. Id.
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The trial court decided to permit removal of the feeding tube.67 The ques-
tion on appeal was whether Claire Conroy's right to privacy outweighed the
state's interest in preserving her life.68 In phrasing the issue as such, the
appellate court presumed that Miss Conroy's constitutional right of privacy
to refuse medical treatment could extend to removal of the feeding tube.6 9
The appellate division then ruled against the trial court, concluding that
withdrawal of Miss Conroy's nasogastric tube would be tantamount to kill-
ing her - not simply letting her die - and that such active euthanasia was
legally and ethically impermissible.7° Miss Conroy subsequently died with
the nasogastric tube in place.7
The Supreme Court of New Jersey thereupon took up the case with a very
narrow focus.72 The court stated that it would determine the circumstances
under which life-sustaining treatment may be withdrawn or withheld from
an incompetent elderly nursing home patient73 who is suffering from serious
and permanent mental and physical impairments, and who will probably die
within approximately one year even with treatment.74 The court's decision
presents and outlines three separate tests which it considered appropriate
standards for making these treatment decisions.
The first standard proffered by the court was the "subjective test." Based
on a guardian's substituted judgment,75 this test is applied when clear and
convincing evidence indicates that the patient would refuse treatment under
the circumstances, were he competent to do SO. 7 6 Acceptable evidence here
67. In Re Conroy, 188 N.J. Super. 523, 530, 457 A.2d 1232, 1239 (Ch. Div.), rev'd, 190
N.J. Super. 453, 464 A.2d 303 (App. Div. 1983).
68. Id.
69. There is some dispute among scholars as to whether the state should have the power
to make these quality-of-life-decisions. See Destro, Quality of Life Ethics and Constitutional
Jurisprudence: The Demise of Natural Rights and Equal Protection for the Disabled and Incom-
petent, 2 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 71 (1986); see also Child Abuse Amendments of
1984, Pub. L. No. 98-457, 98 Stat. 1749 (1984) (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 701-5113)
(where Congress has mandated that seriously ill infants be fed in all cases); Brief Amicus
Curiae of George P. Smith, II, Bowin v. America Hosp. Ass'n, 106 S. Ct. 2101 (1986); Smith,
Defective Newborns and Government Intermeddling, 25 MED. Sci. & LAW 44 (1985).
70. In Re Conroy, 190 N.J. Super. at 464, 464 A.2d at 314.
71. See sources cited supra note 5.
72. In Re Conroy, 98 N.J. at 335, 486 A.2d at 1218.
73. Id. at 98 N.J. at 342, 486 A.2d at 1219; but see Annas, When Procedures Limit Rights.:
From Quinlan to Conroy, 15 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 24 (Apr. 1985) (where the author sug-
gests that a limited focus on nursing home patients instead of the patient's wishes and interests
is mistaken). Dr. Annas criticized the Conroy court for ignoring the plight of Claire Conroy.
Id. at 26.
74. In Re Conroy, 98 N.J. at 342, 486 A.2d at 1219.
75. For a definition of substituted judgment see supra note 31.
76. In Re Conroy, 98 N.J. at 360, 486 A.2d at 1229.
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would be a living will. 7 7 The court makes clear that the evidence used to
apply this test must be clear and expressly on point as to the patient's wishes.
The court neglects, however, to place a needed "stop-gap" on this test in
light of a well established state policy against suicide.78 It is arguable that
this test could come dangerously close to some of the questions dealing with
the distinctions between "orders not to resuscitate" and suicide. 79 The re-
sulting confusion may demonstrate the need for legislative guidelines in
these cases to determine which threshold factors will allow this subjective
standard to be applied. In several instances, state legislatures have ad-
dressed the issue in natural death acts which set forth the procedures for the
living will.80 The subjective test has every potential to be a very good one, as
it is most in keeping with the patient's wishes. It simply needs to be struc-
tured to provide certainty so that it may be applied by the family and physi-
cians in comfort and good conscience.
The second standard offered by the Conroy court was the "limited objec-
tive test."8" This test is applied when there is no clear and convincing evi-
dence of the patient's wishes, but where there is some trustworthy evidence
that the patient would have refused the treatment. This second test is based
upon the theory of "best interest" of the patient. Consideration is given to
medical evidence in weighing the burdens of continued life against the bene-
fits of life given the continued treatment. 82 It should be noted here that this
very same court expressly rejected this approach in Quinlan. There, the
New Jersey court held that evidence from family members regarding this
issue was "remote and impersonal .... [and lacking] in significant probative
weight.",8 3 To the extent that the test in Conroy conflicted with the holding
of Quinlan, it was overruled. 84 This appears to be a positive step toward
77. Id. at 361, 486 A.2d at 1229. A living will is a document in which a person directs
that certain artifical life support measures not be initiated or be discontinued under certain
circumstances. See PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PROBLEMS IN
MEDICINE AND BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, DECIDING TO FOREGO LIFE
SUSTAINING TREATMENT: A REPORT ON THE ETHICAL, MEDICAL, AND LEGAL ISSUES IN
TREATMENT 139-41 (1983). At least 20 states and the District of Columbia have passed "liv-
ing will" legislation. See also CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 7185-7195 (West Supp.
1985); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 6-2421 to -2430 (Supp. 1986) See generally Reaves, supra note 10.
78. See generally Note, Suicide and the Compulsion of Life Saving Medical Procedures:
An Analysis of the Refusal of Treatment Case, 44 BROOKLYN L. REV. 285 (1978).
79. See generally Comment, Medico-Legal Implications of Orders not to Resuscitate, 31
CATH. U.L. REV. 515 (1982).
80. See supra note 8; see also discussion on living wills infra part IV.
81. In Re Conroy, 98 N.J. at 365, 486 A.2d at 1232.
82. Cf R. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF THE LAW (2d ed. 1977).
83. In Re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 22, 355 A.2d 647, 653 (1976).
84. In Re Conroy, 98 N.J. at 362, 486 A.2d at 1230; see also Cantor, Quinlan, Privacy and
the Handling of Incompetent Dying Patients, 30 RUTGERS L. REV. 243 (1977).
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including the patient's wishes in cases of medical decision-making for the
incompetent patient.
Finally, the third test the court provides is the "pure objective test." This
test is to be applied when there is no trustworthy evidence to establish
whether the patient would have declined treatment. Furthermore, the medi-
cal evidence must establish that the net burdens of the patient's life with the
treatment outweigh the benefits that the patient receives when the treatment
is delivered. Where the treatment is so severe and unavoidable that adminis-
tering it would be inhuman, the parties may opt to discontinue the treat-
ment. This pure objective test takes into account more than the other two
tests: the question of the quality of the patient's life is considered here.
Whereas the first two tests allow for evidence of the patient's intent, the
third one is used specifically in the absence of this sort of evidence. There-
fore, in place of the "substituted judgment" considerations, therefore, the
court brings in a quality-of-life analysis. Many commentators believe that
the decision made for the incompetent patient must always incorporate this
analysis. 85
B. Brophy: Recognition of a Single Standard Whose Time has not Come
At approximately midnight on the evening of March 22, 1983, Paul
Brophy awoke complaining to his wife of a "splitting" headache. He rolled
over in bed, never to regain consciousness. The fireman and emergency
medical technician from Easton, Massachusetts who enjoyed deer hunting,
fishing, gardening and performing household chores had suffered serious and
irreversible brain damage. The CAT Scan performed that early morning
revealed subarachnoid bleeding in the posterior fossa surrounding the upper
brain stem. A later angiogram revealed an aneurysm located at the apex of
the basilar artery. On April 6, 1983, surgery was performed, a right
frontotemporal craniotemy. Postoperatively, Mr. Brophy showed no re-
sponse to verbal stimulation, remained unconscious, and exhibited only
slight movement in his upper extremities in response to deep pain. A trache-
otomy was performed after he was removed from the respirator and nutri-
tion was provided by a nasogastric feeding tube.
Mr. Brophy's condition appeared hopeless. After Mr. Brophy showed no
response to intensive physical therapy for four weeks, it was discontinued.
His neurologists, Doctors Russell Butler and Ronald Cranford, who testified
at the trial, reported that Mr. Brophy showed no response to verbal stimuli,
had no "purposeful" movement, and was unable to interact or communicate
85. See generally Smith, Quality of Life, Sanctity of Creation: Palliative or Apotheosis?, 63
NEB. L. REV. 709 (1984).
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through eye movement, body movement or facial expression. He was diag-
nosed as being in a vegetative state with less than one percent likelihood of
ever regaining cognitive functioning. After Mr. Brophy contracted pneumo-
nia in August 1983, Mrs. Brophy, in consultation with her five children,
informed the hospital personnel that it was her desire to have a "Do Not
Resuscitate Order" ("DNR") entered on her husband's chart. Effectively,
this meant that should Mr. Brophy experience cardiac arrest, the hospital
staff was not to administer cardio-pulmonary resuscitation ("CPR").
In keeping with acceptable medical procedures, the nasogastric feeding
tube was replaced by a gastronomy tube which involved the surgical creation
of a stoma through the abdominal wall and into the stomach. A tube is
inserted in this hole and the patient is fed four times a day by pouring liquid
food supplement (similar to baby food) into a plastic bag connected to the
tube. It was the removal of this feeding tube that Mrs. Brophy sought in
January 1985, after agonizing over the decision with her family and parish
priests.
Mrs. Brophy's request was first denied by her husband's attending physi-
cian, Dr. Lajos Koncz, and later by the hospital's Physician-in-Chief, Dr.
Richard Field, who reasoned that the removal of the gastronomy tube would
constitute an unethical medical practice as a "harmful act which would de-
liberately produce [Brophy's] death." The trial court found that aside from
Mr. Brophy's irreversible brain damage, the "general state of [his] health is
relatively good."'8 6 The court observed that Mr. Brophy had at no time been
diagnosed as being terminally ill and that "he is not in danger of imminent
death from any underlying medical illnesses."87 The physicians and staff of
the New England Sinai Hospital were permanently enjoined from either re-
moving or clamping the gastronomy tube for the purpose of denying Mr.
Brophy the hydration and nutrition required to sustain his life, thereby de-
nying Mrs. Brophy's request.88
It is important to remember that the court did look to what the patient's
wishes would be. Effectively, the trial court recognized and adopted the sub-
stituted judgment theory.89 Notwithstanding the lack of "hard evidence,"
(i.e., the existence of a living will), the court accepted testimony from family
members as to what the patient's wishes would have been.90 The trial judge
found that Mr. Brophy's decision "would be to decline the provision of food
86. Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., No. 4152, slip op. at 22 (Mass. Sept. 11 1986).
87. Id.
88. Id. at 45.
89. Id. at 17.
90. Id. at 13.
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and water, and thereby terminate his life."9 The judge concluded that the
basis of Mr. Brophy's decision would be "the present quality-of-life possible
for him, and would not be based upon the burdens imposed upon him by
receiving food and water through a G-tube, which burdens are relatively
minimal, inasmuch as the aforesaid treatment is neither painful nor inva-
sive."92 This projection made by the court must be seen as speculative at
best. It appears that the trial judge may have been attempting to demon-
strate his disdain for a quality-of-life analysis. The fact that a patient had
expressed his wishes based on a quality-of-life analysis should not in any way
undermine what his intentions were. As long as the patient's wishes do not
cross into the realm of suicide, the notion of substituted judgment based on a
quality-of-life view should be considered appropriate.
State legislatures may adopt this subjective test by amending the state's
living will statutes in a way which establishes that a validly executed living
will is presumptively determinative in these situations. For example, where
a guardian is seeking removal or withdrawal of "medical treatment" (includ-
ing, for purposes of this example, a nasogastric feeding tube) from the in-
competent nursing home resident (or "elderly") patient and where there is a
validly executed living will from the patient directing such removal, the
court need not look any further. The physician's certification of a persistent
vegetative state coupled with proof of intrusive or extraordinary mechanical
devices being used to sustain "life" should be sufficient for the courts to
order that patient's directives be carried out.
In essence, the legislators would be providing the judiciary with a sort of
checklist. This could help to validate the living will as well as to expedite the
proceedings. The originally intended use for living wills was to provide di-
rection to the family and health care professionals when the difficult decision
of whether or not to artificially extend someone's life needs to be made. The
subjective test, then, is clear and effective when triggered by use of a living
will. To do otherwise is to provide no incentive to execute a living will. If
an individual is given no hope that his wishes are going to be carried out,
why execute a living will? Establishing, by statute, a procedure by which the
courts could effectuate a living will would provide the necessary incentive.
91. Id. at 12.
92. Id. at 22.
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III. APPLYING THE STANDARDS: WHEN CAN THE GUARDIAN
EFFECTUATE A DECISION To WITHDRAW TREATMENT?
A. Reviewing the Conroy Procedures
Because Miss Conroy was a patient in a nursing home when the action
was brought, the court focused its holding very narrowly on patients who
are similarly situated, namely, nursing home residents. Some have criticized
the Conroy court for this narrow focus, maintaining that it can seldom be
employed.9 3 It is quite possible that in many cases, when the patient's medi-
cal problems have risen to the level where a guardian would need to decide
whether to stop or withhold further medical treatment, the patient has al-
ready been removed from the nursing home and placed in a hospital. Thus
the decision would fall outside the reach of all procedures sanctioned by the
Conroy court.
Notwithstanding this practical barrier, a brief review of the procedures
adopted by the Conroy court is helpful. The decision focuses almost exclu-
sively on the New Jersey Elderly Abuse Statute.94 The 1983 amendments to
the Act provide for the Office of the Ombudsman for the Institutionalized
Elderly to guard against and to investigate allegations of elderly abuse.9"
The court decided that every request for the withdrawal of life-sustaining
treatment from an institutionalized elderly patient would necessarily require
notification of the Office of the Ombudsman. Upon notification, that office is
to begin with the presumption that "abuse" within the meaning of the stat-
ute exists.96 The ombudsman would then conduct an investigation and issue
a report within twenty-four hours to the Commissioner of Human Services
and to any other government agency that regulates or operates the facility.97
This investigation requires collection of information regarding the patient's
condition from the attending physicians and nurses. In addition, two other
physicians unaffiliated with the nursing home must confirm the condition
and prognosis reported by the attending physician.9" The information pro-
vided must then meet the criteria for at least one of the three tests aforemen-
tioned: namely, that a showing of clear evidence, based in good faith that
either the subjective, limited objective, or pure objective test was satisfied.
The guardian, physicians and ombudsman must all agree that the criteria are
met. Then, absent bad faith, all participants can withhold and withdraw
93. See Annas, supra note 73.
94. N.J. STAT. ANN. §§ 52:27g-7.2(a) (West 1986).
95. Id.
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medical treatment with legal immunity.9 9 When either the limited best in-
terest or the pure-objective best interest test is used to reach this conclusion,
the patient's spouse, parents, and children, or in their absence, next of kin,
must also concur." It has been asserted that these procedures are unneces-
sarily cumbersome. 1 1 In addition, the procedures have been criticized for
unnecessarily requiring concurrence of too many individuals. °2
The clearest indication of these tests being overly broad and unrealistic is
the New Jersey court's application of them to the facts in the Conroy case.
Although the facts there appeared to indicate that withdrawal of the feeding
tube was appropriate, the court found that (were Miss Conroy still alive) the
guardian would have to explore the issues further prior to reaching any deci-
sion. 103 The court then warned that the procedures it offered should not be
abused, by stating: "Guardians - and courts, if they are involved - should
act cautiously and deliberately in deciding these cases. The consequences
are most serious - life or death."' 0" Since the Conroy Court stated that it
would not have permitted the removal of Miss Conroy's tube, it affectively
undermined what the decision appears to set out to do.
B. The Need to Recognize Substituted Judgment:
A Review of the Brophy Rationale
Although the Conroy court pays homage to the notion of substituted judg-
ment in offering a subjective test based on the intentions of the patient, it
does not go far enough. The Brophy court, however, takes that extra step.
Both at the trial court and supreme court level, the notion of substituted
judgement is expressly recognized and embraced.'0 5 In giving credence to
the substituted judgment theory, the Brophy court took the next logical step
in the evolution of "right to die" cases. In fact, one of the concurring jus-
tices in the Brophy case questioned whether acknowledgment of "substituted
judgment" was not merely a recognition of a right to commit suicide. Jus-
tice O'Connor, who concurred in part and dissented in part, framed the issue
in Brophy as: "[w]hether the court shall honor the substituted judgment of a
person in a persistent vegetative state that the artificial, effective, and non-
burdensome maintenance of his nutrition and hydration be discontinued by
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. See Note, supra note 3, at 1334; see also Note, In Re Conroy: Self Determination:
Extending the Right to Die, 2 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & POL'Y 351 (1986).
102. Annas, supra note 73, at 25.
103. In Re Conroy, 98 N.J. at 386, 486 A.2d at 1243.
104. Id.
105. Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., No. 85 E 00090-GI, slip op. at 21 (Oct. 21,
1985); Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., No. 4152, slip op. at 20 (Mass. Sept. 11, 1986).
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others in order to bring about his early death ."106 The justice goes on to
reason, in a classic "slippery slope" argument, that acknowledgment of sub-
stituted judgment is simply judicial condonation of a right to suicide - at
any age or state of health.
Fortunately, however, the majority opinion in Brophy stays as close as
possible to a well reasoned analysis of when, and more importantly why, the
doctrine of substituted judgment should be acknowledged. Specifically, the
court in acknowledging substituted judgment may in fact be authorizing or
recognizing a right to die, but it is a right to die a natural death with dignity.
IV. THE LEGISLATIVE ATTEMPT To PROVIDE CERTAINTY IN THE
AREA: A REVIEW OF THE "RIGHT To DIE" LAWS
A. Documented Proof of an Individual's Intentions: The Living Will
Living wills find their genesis in what has been generally referred to as the
"Right to Die" laws.' °7 These state statutes provide for a declaration to be
executed which establishes directives (usually to the physicians and family)
that declarants' lives are not to be artificially prolonged following a medical
determination of imminent death, or in some cases, of irreversible injury
which results in a vegetative state. 108 These state statutes vary in specificity
and applicability.109 (In short, some are good and some are not so good).
For purposes of providing clear direction in the area of decision-making for
the incompetent adult, there remains much work to be done." 0
Most statutes provide a sample living will as an example of what the legis-
lators intended, although states sometimes allow for personal variations."'
106. Brophy, No. 4152, slip op. at 3 (O'Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (emphasis added).
107. See generally Comment, Right to Die a Natural Death and the Living Will, 13 TEX.
TECH. L. REV. 99 (1982); Comment, Right To Die, 10 CAL. W.L. REV. 613 (1974).
108. Four of the states require that the model declaration form be used exactly. CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7188 (West Supp. 1986); GA. CODE ANN. 31-32-1 (1985); IDAHO
CODE § 39-4504 (1985); OR. REV. STAT. § 97.055 (1985). Wisconsin requires the State De-
partment of Health and Social Services to distribute a declaration form contained in the stat-
ute, but the statute does not state that the form is obligatory. WIs. STAT. ANN. § 154.11 (West
Supp. 1986).
109. For example, the Idaho code provides for execution of a living will only after a deter-
mination of terminal illness has been made. IDAHO CODE §§ 39-4503 (3), 39-4504 (1985). By
contrast, the Oklahoma code provides that a living will must be executed (or re-executed) after
a diagnosis of terminal illness has been made in order for the living will to be binding; other-
wise, it may be offered as evidence of the patient's state of mind, but is not determinative.
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 3107 (c) (West Supp. 1987).
110. See Note supra note 10.
111. For example, the District of Columbia law provides that the "declaration shall be
substantially in the following form, but in addition, may include other specific directions,"
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Others, however, require that the specific form set forth in the statute be
used for the document to have legally binding effect. 1 2 For example, the
District of Columbia Code provides, in pertinent part, that the "declaration
shall be substantially in the following form, but in addition may include
other specific decisions,"' 1 3 not inconsistent with the remainder of the Natu-
ral Death Act:
DECLARATION
Declaration made this day of
(month, year).
I, , being of sound mind, willfully
and voluntarily make known my desires that my dying shall not be
artificially prolonged under the circumstances set forth below, do
declare:
If at any time I should have an incurable injury, disease, or ill-
ness certified to be a terminal condition by 2 physicians who have
personally examined me, one of whom shall be my attending physi-
cian, and the physicians have determined that my death will occur
whether or not life-sustaining procedures are utilized and where
the application of life-sustaining procedures would serve only to
artificially prolong the dying process, I direct that such procedures
be withheld or withdrawn, and that I be permitted to die naturally
with only the administration of medication or the performance of
any medical procedure deemed necessary to provide me with com-
fort, care or to alleviate pain.
In the absence of my ability to give directions regarding the use
of such life-sustaining procedures, it is my intention that this decla-
ration shall be honored by my family and physician(s) as the final
expression of my legal right to refuse medical or surgical treatment
and accept the consequences from such refusal.
I understand the full import of this declaration and I am emo-
tionally and mentally competent to make this declaration.
Signed:
Address:
I believe the declarant to be of sound mind. I did not sign the
declarant's signature above for or at the direction of the declarant.
I am at least 18 years of age and am not related to the declarant by
which are not inconsistent with the remainder of the District's Natural Death Act. D.C.
CODE ANN. § 6-2422 (Supp. 1986).
112. See sources cited supra note 107.
113. D.C. CODE ANN. § 6-2422 (Supp. 1986).
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blood or marriage, entitled to any portion of the estate of the de-
clarant according to the laws of intestate succession of the District
of Columbia or under any will of the declarant or codicil thereto,
or directly financially responsible for declarant's medical care. I
am not the declarant's attending physician, an employee of the at-
tending physician, or an employee of the health facility in which
the declarant is a patient.
Witness:
Witness: 114
The living will is usually effective until revoked in a manner authorized by
the statute, 1 5 although in three states 1 6 it is effective only for five years, and
in one it is effective for seven years and must be executed anew at that
time. 1 7 Some states, in cases where the patient is still mentally competent,
require that the living will directive be superseded by the present desires of
the patient. 1 1
The legally binding effect of a living will depends in large part on the
language of the applicable state statute. For example, three states provide
that a declaration is not legally binding unless it is executed after the declar-
ant has been diagnosed as terminally ill.1 ' Each of these state statutes es-
tablishing procedures for an individual's "right to die" provide criminal,
civil and professional immunity to physicians and other health professionals
who comply in good faith with the provisions of a validly executed living
will.' 2 ° Compliance with the directive in the living will usually require that
114. Id.
115. See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 6-2424 (Supp. 1986) which provides for revocation by:
(1) destruction of the document; (2) by written revocation - provided it is communicated to
the physician, or (3) by verbal expression by the declarant - provided it is done in the pres-
ence of a witness and is communicated to the attending physician.
116. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7189 (West Supp. 1985); IDAHO CODE § 39-4504
(1985); WIs. STAT. ANN. § 154.03 (West Supp. 1986).
117. GA. CODE ANN. § 31-32-6 (1984).
118. See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 22-8A-5(a) (1984); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-28-104(a) (1980).
119. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7191(b)(c) (West Supp. 1985); IDAHO CODE
§ 39-4504 (1985); TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. §§ 3, 5 (Vernon Supp. 1986).
120. For example, the Delaware statute specifies that health care providers are immune
from liability unless negligent. The pertinent portions of this act provide: "There shall be no
criminal or civil liability on the part of any person for failure to act in accordance with a
revocation, unless such person had actual or constructive knowledge of the revocation." DEL.
CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 2504(b) (1983). The Act additionally states that:
Physicians or nurses who act in reliance on a document executed in accordance with
this chapter, where such health care personnel have no actual notice of revocation or
contrary indication, by withholding medical procedures from an individual who exe-
cuted such document shall be presumed to be acting in good faith, and unless negli-
gent shall be immune from civil or criminal liability.
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 2505 (1983).
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the physicians have a confirmation of the diagnosis and prognosis and that
the certification of the terminal condition be in writing.' Most of these
acts provide that physicians must comply with a declaration in the living
will, or transfer the patient to another physician who is willing to do so.
122
Furthermore, statutes provide that failure to comply with a declaration may
constitute unprofessional conduct. 23 The Nevada statute is unique in this
regard. It provides that the physicians are not legally bound even by a prop-
erly executed living will and are permitted to take into account any "other
factors" in deciding whether or not to withdraw or withhold life-sustaining
measures.'2 4 This is an example of legislative action prompting inaction. If
the thrust of this type of legislation is to allow an individual to make his own
decision about whether or not to artificially extend his "life," then the stat-
utes must accordingly provide full recognition to a validly executed living
will.
B. Parameters for Execution of a Living Will Declaration
and the Need for Certainty
The requirements that state legislatures have set forth for the execution of
living wills are somewhat analogous to those for traditional wills. Both are
required to be in writing and have witnesses. (It should be remembered that
the purpose of an ordinary last will and testament is to pass property and
that it only speaks upon death). ' 25 The reason for requiring rigid formalities
for testamentary execution of traditional wills is to provide certainty. Once
121. ALA. CODE § 22-8A-3(5) (1984); ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-3201(5) (1986); CAL.
HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7187(e) (West Supp. 1985); COLO. REV. STAT. § 15-18-107
(Supp. 1986); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 6-2421(3) to 6-2422 (Supp. 1986); FLA. STAT. § 765.03(5)
(1986); GA. CODE ANN. § 31-32-2(10) (1985 & Supp. 1986); IOWA CODE ANN. § 144A.5
(West Supp. 1986); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-28-102(e) (1980); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:
1299.58.2(7) (West Supp. 1986); MD. HEALTH-GEN. CODE ANN. § 5-601(f) (Supp. 1986);
MIss. CODE ANN. § 41-41-115 (Supp. 1985); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 137-14:2(V) (Supp.
1985); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 24-7-5(A) (1986); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-321(b) (2) (1985); OKLA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 3102(7) (West Supp. 1987); OR. REV. STAT. § 97.050(5) (1985); UTAH
CODE ANN. § 75-2-1104(4) (Supp. 1986); VA. CODE ANN. § 54-325.8:2 (Supp. 1986); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. § 70.122.020(5) (Supp. 1986); W. VA. CODE § 16-30-2(5) (1985); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 154.07(1)(c) (West Supp. 1986); WYo. STAT. § 33-26-144(a)(v) (Supp. 1986).
122. See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 6-2425, § 6-2427(b) (Supp. 1986).
123. CAL HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7191 (West Supp. 1986); COLO. REV. STAT. §§ 15-
18-113, 12-36-117 (Supp. 1986); D.C. CODE ANN. § 6-2425(c) (Supp. 1986); IND. CODE ANN.
§ 16-8-22 (Burns Supp. 1986); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-28-107(a) (1980); ME. REV. STAT.
ANN. tit. 22, § 2928(a) (Supp. 1986); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 3107 (West Supp. 1987);
OR. REV. STAT. § 97.070(3) (1985); UTAH CODE ANN. § 75-2-1112(3) (Supp. 1986); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 154.07(1)(c) (West Supp. 1986).
124. NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 449.660 (1986).
125. See generally T. ATKINSON, LAW OF WILLS (1953).
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effective, its maker is unavailable to provide clarification should doubt arise.
The formal testamentary requirements were thus established to provide this
certainty. The purpose of a living will, on the other hand, is to provide
direction to family and physicians as to what medical treatment is or is not
permissible in certain situations. Although the living will arguably speaks
before death, the same considerations for certainty are present as with the
traditional will. Specifically, the declarant is also unavailable, not because of
death, but because of a comatose state. In giving legal effect to the living
will, courts will need to establish that the individual declarant is unavailable
and therefore unable to provide clarification or direction as to his intent in
much the same way as a testator would. The living will then speaks for the
declarant at the happening of these events. There is a need for state statutes
establishing living wills to provide for execution formalities in a way similar
to that which the Wills Act 12 6 and the Statute of Frauds 127 do for a regular
will to provide the same needed certainty. The courts are in a better position
to validate living wills and use them as rebuttable presumption evidence of
the patient's intent - in effect validating the notion of substituted judgment.
The problem, however, is that the living will statutes do not always provide
certainty.128 To ascertain whether a statute effectively adheres to an individ-
ual's intentions, one must first examine the execution provisions of the law.
Most living will statutes have specific provisions for execution.1 29 All of
these states except Arkansas1 30 provide that a requisite mental capacity is
necessary before the document can be legally binding. This usually requires
that the declarant attest to the fact that he is of sound mind and/or is emo-
tionally and mentally competent at the time of the execution of the declara-
tion. "' The Arkansas statute requires the same formalities for the execution
of a living will as for the execution of an ordinary will. 132 In addition to the
126. Y.B. 32 Hen. VIII, c. 1 (1540).
127. Y.B. 29 Chas. II, c. 3 (1677).
128. The typical living will statute provides broad general language in terms of the "direc-
tive to physicians." As a result, notwithstanding the individual's intentions expressed in the
living will, the physician has a great deal of discretion in terms of defining when the patient is
"terminally ill," for example. For a good discussion of the physician's viewpoint, see Relman,
The Saikewicz Decision: A Medical Viewpoint, 4 AM. J. L. & MED. 233 (1979).
129. For example, the District of Columbia statute provides that the declarant be "of
sound mind and must make the directive willfully and voluntarily." D.C. CODE ANN. § 6-
2422(c) (Supp. 1986). Additionally, the statute provides that, "[a] directive may be executed
by any person 18 years of age or older, or by another person at the express direction of the
declarant and in the declarant's presence." Id. at § 6-2422.
130. The Arkansas statute does, however, require that the formalities for execution of a
will be followed. The Arkansas Probate Code specifies that a person must be of sound mind
and eighteen years of age or older to make a will. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 82-3801 (1986).
131. Relman, supra note 128.
132. See supra note 129.
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capacity requirement, fourteen of these statutes provide that the individual
must attest to the fact that his execution of the living will was performed
willfully and voluntarily.
In addition to mental prerequisites for execution, twenty-one of the thirty-
six jurisdictions having these statutes specify that a declarant must have
reached the age of majority or adulthood to be legally competent. The Illi-
nois statute provides that an emancipated person (a minor who has demon-
strated the ability to live on his own) may execute a living will.13 3 Only the
North Carolina statute fails to indicate at what age a person is competent to
make a declaration for a natural death, leaving the question open.1 34 The
states of Arkansas, 135 Louisiana 13 6 and New Mexico,' 37 in their Natural
Death Acts, provide for declarations to be executed by others on behalf of
minors. The Alabama, 3 ' District of Columbia 139 and Kansas' 4° statutes
take this one step further and provide for execution of a living will by a third
party on behalf of a competent adult. The caveat here is that this third party
execution for the competent adult must be done in the presence and at the
express direction of the declarant. These procedures are similar to those
required by many state statutes for the execution of a valid will by proxy.
With regard to living wills executed by patients in nursing homes or
skilled nursing facilities, three of the state statutes require the declarations to
be witnessed by an ombudsman or patient advocate for them to be valid."14
133. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 1101/2, para. 703 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1986).
134. However, the North Carolina statute contains a unique provision establishing proce-
dures for the withholding or withdrawal of life-sustaining treatment in the absence of a decla-
ration and where the following circumstances exist: (1) an individual is comatose and there is
no reasonable possibility that he/she will return to a cognitive sapient state or is mentally
incapacitated; (2) it has been determined by the attending physician that the person's present
condition is terminal, incurable, and irreversible; (3) there is confirmation of the person's pres-
ent condition in writing by a physician other than the attending physician; and (4) a vital
function of the person could be restored by extraordinary means or a vital function of the
person is being sustained by extraordinary means. Under these circumstances and in the ab-
sence of a declaration executed in conformance with the statute's requirements, the extraordi-
nary means may be discontinued upon the direction and under the supervision of the attending
physician at the request of, and in the following order: (i) the person's spouse, or (ii) a guard-
ian of the person, or (iii) a majority of the relatives of the first degree. But if none of the above
are available the extraordinary means may be discontinued upon the direction and under the
supervision of the attending physician. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-322(a), (b) (1985).
135. ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 82-3802, 82-3803 (Supp. 1985).
136. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.58.6. (West Supp. 1986).
137. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 24-7-3A, 24-7-4 (1986).
138. ALA. CODE § 22-8A-4(a) (1984).
139. D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 6-2422(a)(2), 6-2423 (Supp. 1986).
140. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-28-103 (1980).
141. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7188.5 (West Supp. 1985); DEL. CODE ANN. tit.
16, § 2506(c) (1983); D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 6-2422, 6-2423 (Supp. 1986).
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The Georgia statute provides that the declaration must be witnessed by the
chief of the hospital medical staff or the medical director of the nursing facil-
ity when the patient is confined to a hospital or nursing home.14 2 These
provisions attempt to alleviate the potential for abuse.
In an effort to alleviate problems which may arise under their state's strict
formalities in living will execution, Delaware, Florida, Louisiana and Vir-
ginia have included in their statutes a provision whereby the declarant may
designate another person to make the treatment decision should the declar-
ant be rendered incapable of communicating. 143 Although these particular
provisions remain untested, there is some question as to whether this grant
of authority would withstand judicial scrutiny in the absence of any specific
standards upon which third parties may rely. The Arkansas statute argua-
bly goes beyond reasonable boundaries for execution of these documents by
allowing the declaration to be executed by a third party on behalf of incom-
petent adults without a prior designation by the individual.'" These grants
of decisional authority for an incompetent patient are precisely the type of
"slippery slope" which courts have attempted to avoid in many of the diffi-
cult "right to die" cases heretofore presented. It appears likely that this type
of decision-making power would be more acceptable with certain boundaries
or constraints placed upon it by the declarant himself. One such constraint
may be to require that the declaration articulate some standard which the
third party is to apply in making the decision. For example, certification by
at least two physicians that death is imminent and there has been irreversible
brain damage, or that the individual is in a persistent vegetative state. Then
should judicial intervention be sought, the court would have a reasonable
basis upon which to evaluate the third party's decision for the incompetent
patient by applying the particular facts to the specific standard.
V. THE NEXT QUESTION: Is NOURISHMENT MEDICAL TREATMENT?
Given the ability of a guardian to exercise a right of privacy for the incom-
petent patient by denying consent for medical treatment under certain condi-
tions, it was important for the Conroy and Brophy courts to determine
exactly what constitutes medical treatment. Specifically, the courts had to
decide the issue of whether the administration of an artificial feeding tube
could be equated with other forms of treatment that have been held to be
removable. Some courts have allowed removal of a mechanical respirator
142. GA. CODE ANN. § 31-32-4 (1985).
143. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 2502(a), (b) (1983); FLA. STAT. § 765.03 (West 1986); LA.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 40:1299.58.3B(2) (West Supp. 1986); VA. CODE ANN. §§ 54-325.8:3, 54-
325.8:4 (Supp. 1986).
144. ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 82-3802, 82-3803 (Supp. 1985).
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from a patient, pursuant to a guardian's request 4 ' and withdrawal of a pa-
tient from kidney dialysis treatment.146 These decisions, however, were
based in part on the reasoning that it was only the mechanical devices that
kept the patient alive and that the patient should be allowed to die a natural
death. A doubt arises due to a notion that a nutrient feeding tube is basic
sustenance which, if discontinued, would cause the patient to die of starva-
tion, not a natural death. 14 7 Even in the cases where a mechanical respirator
was removed, feeding was continued.' 48
The Conroy court, by contrast, was quick to include the nasogastric feed-
ing tube within the realm of removable medical treatment. In discussing this
issue, the court noted that it is difficult to shed the "emotional symbolism"
of food,149 but went on to find that:
artificial feeding such as nasogastric tubes, gastrostomes, and intra-
venous infusions are significantly different from bottle-feeding or
spoon-feeding - they are medical procedures with inherent risks
and possible side effects, instituted by skilled health care providers
to compensate for impaired physical functioning. Analytically, ar-
tificial feeding by means of a nasogastric tube or intra-venous infu-
sion can be seen as equivalent to artificial breathing by means of a
respirator. Both prolong life through mechanical means when the
body is no longer able to perform a vital bodily function on its
own. 150
This analysis may be flawed in that it focuses on the wrong side of the
question. It is undisputed that a mechanical feeding device (i.e., nasogastric
feeding tube) assists in prolonging life when the bodily function can no
longer act on its own, as a respirator would. However, the real question is
whether the true effect of its removal is natural death or starvation. It is
further undisputed that the removal of a feeding device will assure the death
145. In Re Quinlan, 70 N.J. 10, 355 A.2d 647 (1976); State v. Permutter, 362 So. 2d 160
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1978).
146. In Re Spring, 380 Mass. 629, 405 N.E.2d 115 (1980).
147. See Callahan, On Feeding the Dying, 13 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 22 (Oct. 1983)
(which explains that when Karen Quinlan's father was asked if he wanted Karen's intravenous
feeding stopped he said, "Oh no, that is her nourishment."). See also Lynn & Childress, Must
Patients Always Be Given Food and Water?, 13 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 17, 20 (Oct. 1983).
148. Lynn & Childress, supra note 147, at 20.
149. Cf. Barber v. People, 147 Cal. App. 3d 1006, 195 Cal. Rptr. 484 (1983) (Although this
case was brought in a criminal context - specifically, a homicide prosecution for death result-
ing from withdrawal of life support systems - it was one of the first state court cases that
equated artificial (here intravenous) feeding with all other artificial life support systems. Any
distinction, this court noted, was based "more on the emotional symbolism of providing food
and water to those incapable of providing for themselves, rather than on any rational differ-
ence." Id.
150. In Re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 373, 486 A.2d 1209, 1236 (1985).
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of the patient, 15 while removal of a respirator will not.' 52 Karen Ann Quin-
lan, for example, lived for ten years after the artificial respirator was re-
moved. This was an unexpected event for those involved in her case,
especially her physicians who had predicted that she would not live without
artificial respiration. She continued, however, to receive an artificial supply
of nutrition during those ten years.'
53
In the case of Paul Brophy, the trial judge held that any patient who was
to have a nutrient feeding tube removed would likely experience the follow-
ing effects:
(a) His mouth would dry out and become caked or coated with
thick material.
(b) His lips would become parched and cracked or fizzured
(sic).
(c) His tongue would become swollen and might crack.
(d) His eyes would sink back into their orbits.
(e) His cheeks would become hollow.
(f) The mucosa (lining) of his nose might crack and cause his
nose to bleed.
(g) His skin would hang loose on his body and become dry and
scaly.
(h) His urine would become highly concentrated, causing
burning of the bladder.
(i) The lining of his stomach would dry out and cause dry
heaves and vomiting.
(j) He would develop hyperthermia, a very high body
temperature.
(k) His brain cells would begin drying out, causing
convulsions.
(1) His respiratory tract would dry out, giving rise to very thick
secretions, which could plug his lungs and cause death.
(m) Eventually his major organs would fail, including his
lungs, heart and brain.'
54
Accordingly, that state trial court made a more well-defined distinction
between removing various medical support systems of a mechanical nature
and withdrawing the supply of food. 155 In Brophy, the trial court conceded
that only where a patient is terminally ill or has reached the end of his nor-
151. Id; see also Barber, 147 Cal. App. 3d at 1016, 195 Cal. Rptr. at 490 (1983).
152. Brophy v. New England Sinai Hosp., No. 4152, slip op. at 20 (Mass. Sept. 11, 1986).
153. To the surprise of most people including her physicians, Karen Ann Quinlan lived
some 10 years beyond her removal from the artificial respirator. She died on June 15, 1985.
154. Brophy, No. 4152, slip op. at 26.
155. Id. at 27.
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mal span of years, the distinction is less clear, intimating that under these
latter circumstances the food may qualify as "extraordinary" care so as to be
removable.' 56 However, although the Brophy trial court held that: "It is
ethically inappropriate to cause the preventable death of Brophy by the de-
liberate denial of food and water, which can be provided to him in a
noninvasive, nonintrusive manner which causes no pain and suffering, irre-
spective of the substituted judgment of the patient,"15 7 the Massachusetts
Supreme Court disagreed. In the majority opinion, Justice Liacos stated
that the determination that a feeding tube is extraordinary or ordinary care
should not be the "sole or major" factor in these decisions.' 58 Rather, this
creates what he termed a "distinction without meaning." The court stated,
"Just as the distinction between extraordinary and ordinary arguably ob-
scures the real issue, so, too, the distinction between withholding and with-
drawing treatment has no moral significance." '159 The Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts went on to find that Mr. Brophy's feeding tube was
"not only intrusive, but extraordinary," and thus removable. 60
The Conroy court also fostered the notion that the feeding tube is treat-
ment by noting that these procedures provide complications that are some-
times serious and distressing to the patient.1 61  The court noted that
nasogastric tubes may lead to pneumonia, cause irritation and discomfort,
and require arm restraints for incompetent patients.' 62 Moreover, the vol-
ume of fluid needed to carry nutrients itself is sometimes harmful.
163
Justice Schreiber, writing for the majority in Conroy, had a view of dehy-
dration directly opposite from Judge Koplemann who wrote the recent
Brophy decision in Massachusetts. Schreiber's analysis in Conroy suggests
that:
For patients who are unable to sense hunger and thirst, withhold-
ing of feeding devices such as nasogastric tubes may not result in
more pain than the termination of other medical treatment. In-
deed, it has been observed that patients near death who are not
receiving nourishment may be more comfortable than patients with
156. Id.
157. Id. at 28.
158. Id. at 29.
159. Id.
160. Id. at 30.
161. Lo & Dornbrand, Sounding Board. Guiding the Hand that Feeds: Caring for the
Demented Elderly, 311 NEW ENG. J. MED. 402 (1984); see also Ferweich, The Dehydration
Question, 13 NURSING 83 47 (1983); Paris & Fletcher, Infant Doe Regulations and the Absolute
Requirement to use Nourishment and Fluids for the Dying Infant, 11 LAW, MED. & HEALTH
CARE 210 (1983).
162. Lo & Dornbrand, supra note 161, at 402; Lynn & Childress, supra note 147, at 17-18.
163. Ferweich, supra note 161, at 51.
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comparable conditions who are being fed and hydrated artifically.
Thus, it cannot be assumed that it will always be beneficial for an
incompetent patient to receive artificial feedings or harmful for
him not to receive it.164
The court then concluded that withholding or withdrawing artificial feed-
ing would be permissible if there is sufficient proof to satisfy the subjective,
limited-objective, or pure-objective test. 165 The danger in allowing any court
to adopt this type of analysis of feeding is that the judiciary takes on a com-
bined role of judge, jury, doctor and God. It is quite possible that the char-
acterization of nourishment as beneficial or harmful for the patient, are
better left to the health care professionals and the families. The analysis is
nearly unconscionable if one thinks of Conroy as the first step in judicially
sanctioned starvation.
CONCLUSION
A critical review of the Conroy and Brophy decisions reveals the struggle
of the judiciary in attempting to answer the questions involved in life and
death decision-making for incompetent persons. Perhaps some of the confu-
sion in these decisions is evidence of the fact that these questions are not
strictly legal but are also medical, moral and religious.
Judicial intervention, however, is inevitable. As conflicts among physi-
cians and between physicians and families arise, their resolution will invaria-
bly be sought in a court of law. With such a system, the judiciary must be
attuned to all of the competing but legitimate interests. Beyond the obvious
and overwhelmingly important state interest in preservation of life, the
courts need to continue to strive for certainty. Living wills are examples of
how the decisional void can be filled when addressing the life and death
questions of the incompetent patient. Courts need to recognize what would
have been the intentions of the patient were he competent to provide the
necessary direction. An ideal demonstration of the incompetent patient's
wishes is a living will.
Finally, whether a nasogastric feeding tube rises to the level of "extraordi-
nary" medical treatment so as to be removable is probably a question better
suited for the individual physicians and families involved, not the courts.
The emotional stigma associated with withholding food is unfortunately ob-
164. In Re Conroy, 98 N.J. 321, 373, 486 A.2d 1209, 1236 (citations omitted).
165. See Wanzer, Adelstein, Cranford, Federman, Hook, Moertel, Safer, Stone, Taussing &
Van Eys, The Physician's Responsibility Toward Hopelessly Ill Patients, 310 NEW ENG. J.
MED. 955, 958 (1984). See generally Smith, Triage: Endgame Realities, 1 J. CONTEMP.
HEALTH L. & POL'Y 143 (1985).
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structing some individuals' views of the overall question: whether an indi-
vidual does in fact have a right to die.
Scott E. Squillace
